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GARTH, Circuit Judge.
The National Labor Relations Board (Board) applies to
this Court to enforce, and St. George Warehouse, Inc., (St.
George) cross-petitions this Court to review, an order
awarding backpay to two former St. George employees who
were terminated for unlawfully discriminatory reasons. St.
George argues that General Counsel for the Board did not
meet its burden of producing evidence as to the
reasonableness of the discriminatees‟ post-termination efforts
to seek employment. Because we conclude that there was
substantial evidence to support the Board‟s findings
concerning mitigation, we will enforce the Board‟s order
awarding backpay and deny the cross-petition for review.
I.
In March 1999, St. George discharged forklift-operator
Leonard Sides and warehouseman Jesus “Jesse” Tharp. Sides
and Tharp appealed their respective discharges to an ALJ.
The ALJ ordered St. George to reinstate Sides and Tharp and
make them whole for their losses, concluding that they had
been subject to surveillance and discharged discriminatorily
by St. George on account of their involvement in a union. In
a June 23, 2000, decision and order, the Board affirmed the
ALJ‟s findings and conclusions, and adopted the ALJ‟s order
as modified. 331 N.L.R.B. 454 (2000). We thereupon
enforced the Board‟s order on April 23, 2001. 261 F.3d 493
(3d Cir. 2001). Our judgment was later amended on June 5,
2001.
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Sides and Tharp were offered reinstatement on
September 1, 2000, but both declined. As a consequence,
each was entitled to receive backpay from the date of his
discharge (March 31, 1999, for Sides; March 16, 1999, for
Tharp) until September 1, 2000. St. George calculated the
backpay it owed for that period as $6,618.40 to Sides and
$8,302.02 to Tharp, and paid each accordingly.
On May 28, 2002, the Regional Director of the Board
issued a Compliance Specification and Notice of Hearing,1
which estimated additional amounts of backpay due to Sides
and Tharp. At the subsequent compliance (backpay) hearing
on October 8, 2002, neither Tharp nor Sides testified, and
General Counsel,2 who represented the discriminatees, did not
1

The Regional Director is the Board agent responsible
for issuing “a compliance specification in the name of the
Board” 1) when “it appears that controversy exists with
respect to compliance with an order of the Board which
cannot be resolved without a formal proceeding,” or 2)
“[w]henever the Regional Director deems it necessary in
order to effectuate the purposes and policies of the [NLRA]
or to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” 29 C.F.R. § 102.54(a)
& (b). “With respect to allegations concerning the amount of
backpay due,” the compliance specification must “specifically
and in detail show, for each employee, the backpay periods
broken down by calendar quarters, the specific figures and
basis of computation of gross backpay and interim earnings,
the expenses for each quarter, the net backpay due, and any
other pertinent information.” Id. § 102.55(a).
2

The General Counsel of the Board “exercise[s]
general supervision over all attorneys employed by the Board
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call any witnesses. St. George called a vocational expert,
Donna Flannery, to testify that neither Sides nor Tharp had
adequately sought to mitigate damages by exercising
reasonable diligence in seeking interim employment.
Flannery asserted that, based on employment statistics and
newspaper advertisements, there were a substantial number of
comparable jobs available to Tharp and Sides during their
respective backpay periods. However, she admitted that she
had not interviewed either of them.
In an October 30, 2002, Supplemental Decision, the
ALJ noted in her analysis that the burden of establishing that
Sides and Tharp had failed to mitigate their damages rested
exclusively with St. George, and did not shift back to General
Counsel at any point. The ALJ found that St. George did not
meet its burden of proving that Sides and Tharp had failed to
exercise diligence in finding new work. As a consequence,
the ALJ recommended that each be given additional backpay
in the amounts of $26,447.90 to Sides and $14,649.79 to
Tharp.
Nearly five years later, on September 30, 2007, the
Board issued a Supplemental Decision and Order remanding
. . . and over the officers and employees in the regional
offices,” as well as “final authority, on behalf of the Board, in
respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of
complaints under [29 U.S.C. § 160], and in respect of the
prosecution of such complaints before the Board.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(d). In investigating and prosecuting unfair-labor
complaints, the General Counsel acts independently of the
Board. See NLRB v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 613 F.3d
275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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this matter to the ALJ. The Board articulated a new standard
of proof for backpay hearings: while employers would
continue to bear the burden of persuasion as to an employee‟s
alleged failure to engage in a reasonable search for new work,
as well as the burden of producing evidence that there were
substantially equivalent jobs within the relevant geographic
area, General Counsel and the employee would now have the
burden of producing evidence that the employee took
reasonable steps to pursue those jobs. 351 N.L.R.B. 961, 961
(2007). In applying that new burden-shifting framework to
the facts of this case, the Board concluded that St. George had
produced evidence of substantially equivalent jobs within the
area, but that General Counsel had not met its burden of
production as to the employees‟ reasonable diligence to
mitigate. As a result, the Board remanded to the ALJ to
reopen the record to allow the parties to present evidence
consistent with the revised burden of production, as declared
by the Board.
A.
Remand hearings were held before a new ALJ on
February 26 and March 14, 2008. With respect to Sides‟s
claim for backpay, General Counsel called Sides and
Salvatore LoSauro, supervisor for the records unit at the New
Jersey Department of Labor Employment Service (NJDOL)
Employment Service, as witnesses. Sides testified that after
being discharged from St. George, where he had worked for
one-and-a-half years, he went to a New Jersey unemployment
office and filed for benefits on April 18, 1999. On April 29,
1999, Sides registered at the veterans unit of the NJDOL
Employment Service for help in returning to the workforce.
On May 7, 1999, Sides was found eligible for unemployment
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benefits, and received his first unemployment check on June
1, 1999.
Sides also testified that between March 1999 and
October 2000, he reviewed job listings in newspapers,
primarily the Sunday Star Ledger. Sides did not own a car,
and thus, his job search was restricted to positions within
twenty-five miles of his home and within walking distance
(about a mile) of public transportation. He also inquired
about potential openings through friends and associates.
Sides found temporary work at two temporary staffing
agencies, Labor Ready and J & J Staffing Resources, Inc. At
Labor Ready, Sides stocked shelves from October 25, 1999 to
November 26, 1999. At J & J, Sides unloaded tractor-trailers
three to five days a week from November or December 1999
until March 12, 2000. Even as he worked in his temporary
position at J & J, Sides continued to seek out long-term
employment.
Sides kept records documenting his work search,
which were admitted into evidence. Those records indicate
that from March 1999 through August 2000, Sides applied to
at least thirty-three positions (including Labor Ready and J &
J), eight of which (from May 3 to September 30, 1999) were
referred to him by the Unemployment Office. He also took a
one-day forklift-certification class at the NJDOL in
September 2009, and that he called a number of other
employers to determine whether their businesses were located
in an accessible area, but did not make a list of those
employers because he had not been instructed to do so.
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On the other hand, St. George produced evidence that
on October 3, 2002, it had written to sixteen of the employers
listed by Sides in order to verify his records. While most
employers did not respond, or replied that they did not keep
such information on file, four responded that they specifically
did not have an application from Sides on file, and one
confirmed that Sides had applied. In addition, General
Counsel produced employers‟ verifications of four other
applications that Sides had submitted.
LoSauro testified that he first spoke with Sides on
April 29, 2009, when Sides was interviewed by the NJDOL
about his experience and qualifications, and NJDOL gave
Sides an assessment of his employment prospects. LoSauro
characterized Sides as “a very active job searcher,” and
testified that NJDOL had given Sides eight job referrals
between May and September 2009. LoSauro also explained
that verifications of applications are difficult to produce
because few employers complete Job Bank Employer
Reference forms, and those which are returned to the NJDOL
are destroyed soon after.
B.
With respect to Tharp‟s claim for backpay, General
Counsel called Gail Moskus, Tharp‟s mother, as well as
Collette Sarro, a regional compliance officer with the Board.
Tharp had died before the proceeding began, and thus, was
unavailable to testify.
According to the documentation that General Counsel
entered into evidence, Tharp was discharged by St. George on
March 16, 1999, after working there for approximately six
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years. He applied for unemployment benefits the following
day. On his application for benefits, he certified that he was
“ready, willing, and able to work full time” and would be able
to begin work “at once.” He received benefits from May 1,
1999, until June 26, 1999. Most records of Tharp‟s job
search were unavailable, but on a Board backpay-claim
questionnaire Tharp had completed in June 1999, he listed
seven employers to whom he had applied unsuccessfully
between June 24 and June 28, 1999.
After Tharp was discharged, he spoke with Moskus on
the phone twice a month. Based on those conversions,
Moskus testified that Tharp had looked for work “every day”
in New Jersey for about four months, but he became “very
discouraged because he couldn‟t find work.” Then, in midSeptember 1999, Tharp moved to Naples, Florida. Collette
Sarro‟s testimony confirmed that prior to moving to Florida,
Tharp called her to tell her that he was relocating because “he
couldn‟t find a job and couldn‟t afford to pay his rent.”
Moskus also testified that about two weeks after Tharp
arrived in Florida, he began looking for forklift-driver and
warehouse positions in the area. He searched for jobs by
making phone inquiries, scanning newspaper listings, and
having Moskus drive him to businesses to fill out
applications. (Tharp did not own a car in New Jersey or
Florida.) From September to October 1999, Tharp applied for
jobs with at least three Florida employers. On October 19,
1999, he accepted a job offer to work as a yardman and
forklift operator for Naples Lumber, which, among the jobs
he applied for, was the closest in salary and description to his
position with St. George. Tharp held that position with
Naples Lumber through September 1, 2000.
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C.
In a Second Supplemental Decision dated May 20,
2008, the ALJ credited Sides‟s and Moskus‟s testimonies and
determined that, based on the evidenced introduced by
General Counsel, both Sides and Tharp had made diligent,
reasonable efforts to find new work. Accordingly, the ALJ
recommended an order awarding them the backpay amounts
ordered by the first ALJ in the October 30, 2002,
Supplemental Decision -- i.e., $26,447.90 for Sides and
$14,646.79 for Tharp (now Tharp‟s estate). A two-member
quorum of the Board affirmed the ALJ‟s rulings, findings,
and conclusions, and adopted the recommended order. 353
N.L.R.B. No. 50 (2008).
St. George petitioned this Court to review the Board‟s
order, and General Counsel cross-petitioned for enforcement.
While the petitions were pending, the Supreme Court decided
New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, holding that section 3(b) of
the NLRA “requires that a delegee group maintain a
membership of three in order to exercise the delegated
authority of the Board.” 130 S.Ct. 2635, 2644 (2010). Since
the Board‟s order in this case had been entered by a twomember panel, we vacated the Board‟s order in light of New
Process Steel and remanded to the Board for further
proceedings. 394 F.App‟x 902, 903 (3d Cir. 2010). We also
dismissed General Counsel‟s cross-petition for enforcement
as moot.
On remand, a three-member panel of the Board
affirmed the ALJ‟s May 20, 2008, rulings, findings, and
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conclusions, and adopted the ALJ‟s recommended order. 355
N.L.R.B. No. 81 (2010).
General Counsel again applies to this Court for
enforcement of the Board‟s order, and St. George crosspetitions this Court for review of same.
II.
The Board had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §
160(a)-(c). We have jurisdiction over the Board‟s final order
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) & (f).
On appeal from a Board order awarding backpay, the
Board‟s findings of fact “will be upheld unless the record,
considered as a whole, shows no substantial evidence to
support those findings.” Atl. Limousine, Inc., v. NLRB, 243
F.3d 711, 715 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 88 Transit Lines, Inc. v.
NLRB, 55 F.3d 823, 825 (3d Cir. 1995)). Substantial
evidence means “evidence that a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate to support an agency‟s conclusion.” Id. at
718 (citation omitted).
The Board‟s determinations on questions of law are
subject to plenary review, but with “due deference to the
Board‟s expertise in labor matters.” Id. at 715 (citing 88
Transit, 55 F.3d at 825). A backpay order will not be
disturbed “„unless it can be shown that the order is a patent
attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be
said to effectuate the policies of the Act.‟” 88 Transit, 55
F.3d at 825 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964)).
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The ALJ‟s credibility determinations, which the Board
here affirmed, “„should not be reversed unless inherently
incredible or patently unreasonable.‟” Atl. Limousine, 243
F.3d at 718-19 (quoting NLRB v. Lee Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d
1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1994)).
III.
A.
When the Board determines that an employee has been
subjected to an unfair labor practice, it has broad discretion to
fashion a back pay order that effectuates the policies
underlying the NLRA. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. 215 (citing 29
U.S.C. § 160(c)). Requiring an employer to make the
employee whole through back pay serves “a two-fold
objective”: (1) “the back pay reimburses the innocent
employee for the actual losses which he has suffered as a
direct result of the employer‟s improper conduct,” and (2) it
“furthers the public interest advanced by the deterrence of
such illegal acts.” NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d
1307, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
B.
St. George challenges the backpay award to Sides,
arguing that: 1) based on the evidence produced by General
Counsel, Sides‟s search for employment did not meet the
reasonable diligence standard; and 2) Sides‟s backpay should
be tolled for the periods in which he did not apply for jobs.
Therefore, St. George asserts, the backpay it has already
given Sides fully discharged its duty to make Sides whole.
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St .George argues that a discriminatee‟s singular
reliance on unemployment office referrals is insufficient to
satisfy the reasonable diligence standard. See NLRB v.
Arduini Mfg. Corp., 394 F.2d 420, 424 (1st Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Puch & Barr, Inc., 207 F.2d 409, 10 (4th Cir. 1953).
However, it is well-established in Board case law that
“[r]egistration with a state unemployment office is prima
facie evidence of a reasonable search for employment.”
Church Homes, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 829, 834 (2007); see also,
e.g., Allegheny Graphics, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 1141, 1145
(1996), enforced, 113 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 1997); Firestone
Synthetic Fibers, 207 N.L.R.B. 810, 812 (1973); accord
NLRB v. Midwestern Personnel Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 418,
424 (7th Cir. 2007). Sides‟s registration with the New Jersey
unemployment office therefore reflects favorably on his
efforts to mitigate.
Moreover, by suggesting that Sides‟s search was
limited to job referrals from the unemployment office, St.
George understates the extent of Sides‟s efforts to find
interim employment. Sides testified that, in addition to
visiting the unemployment office approximately each week
from May 1999 to September 1999, he consulted job listings
in the newspaper at least every weekend, visited employers,
and asked friends to inquire about job openings on his behalf;
he independently applied for two openings he had found in
the newspaper between March 1999 and October 1999; he
registered with the NJDOL and, as LoSauro testified, was
“very active” in soliciting that office‟s assistance in procuring
new employment; and he became certified as a forklift
operator in September 1999 to enhance his marketable skills.
Those combined efforts are consistent with reasonable
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diligence. See, e.g., Midwestern Personnel, 508 F.3d at 42526 (holding that employee who put name on union‟s lookingfor-work list, searched for work through friends, reviewed
want ads in local newspaper, and submitted one application
on his own before obtaining referral through union had
conducted reasonable search); Canova v. NLRB, 708 F.2d
1498, 1506 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that workers who placed
their names with state unemployment office and on union outof-work list, visited and applied to local employers, and
looked through newspaper ads had diligently sought interim
employment).
Furthermore, from October 1999 to May 2000, Sides
found employment with two temporary staffing agencies:
Labor Ready, from October 25, 1999, to November 26, 1999,
and J & J, from November or December 1999 to March 12,
2000. Even while working for J & J, Sides applied for longterm jobs with eight other employers, which speaks to the
sincerity of his search. See Allegheny Graphics, 320
N.L.R.B. at 1145 (concluding that efforts of discriminatee,
who “applied for unemployment benefits, sought permanent
employment, and continued to seek such employment even
after he was hired by a temporary agency,” were reasonable,
as distinct from discriminatee who did not file for
unemployment and only sought temporary positions). After
his job through J & J expired, Sides applied to thirteen
positions over the next four-and-a-half months, and received a
job offer in August 2000 to begin working in September
2000. Sides‟s procurement of temporary work, his continued
search for permanent work even while employed temporarily,
and his subsequent efforts to find a job once his temporary
positions expired evince a reasonably diligent effort to locate
employment. See Midwestern Personnel, 508 F.3d at 425
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(concluding that employee who applied to eight employers
during six-month period, and found temporary work with one,
exercised reasonable diligence during that period).
St. George also argues that Sides unduly circumscribed
the scope of his search to a limited geographic area. But the
fact that Sides only considered applying to jobs within
twenty-five miles from his home -- the same distance that St.
George had been -- and within a mile from public
transportation does not render his search any less reasonable.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Westin Hotel, 758 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th
Cir. 1985) (determining employee acted reasonably in
choosing not to apply for available positions twenty-five
miles away from home because she did not have adequate
transportation); Church Homes, 349 N.L.R.B. at 833 n.9
(“Discriminatees are not required to accept employment
where they would encounter transportation difficulties due to
the location of the employment opportunity.”); Am. Bottling
Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1303, 1304 n.5 (1956) (concluding
discriminatees acted reasonably by declining to seek jobs in
area “at least from 9 to 30 miles” from their former
employment, in light of “burdensome transportation
problems” it would pose). Inasmuch as “an employee need
not seek employment „which involves conditions that are
substantially more onerous than [her] previous position,‟”
Sides was not obligated to look for jobs substantially further
than St. George was from his home. Donlin v. Philips
Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 89 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Madison Courier, 472 F.2d at 1320-21).
Finally, St. George asserts that, at a minimum, Sides‟s
backpay should be tolled for several periods -- some two- and
three-weeks long -- during which he did not submit any
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applications. However, St. George improperly asks this court
to view certain periods of inactivity in a vacuum rather than
scrutinize Sides‟s efforts holistically. The demand for
reasonable diligence does not necessarily oblige a
discriminatee to undertake a daily search for employment;
rather, “„[t]he sufficiency of a discriminatee‟s efforts to
mitigate back-pay are determined with respect to the backpay period as a whole and not based on isolated portions of
the back-pay period.‟” Midwestern Personnel, 508 F.3d at
425 (quoting Local 3, IBEW, 315 N.L.R.B. 1266, 1266
(1995)); accord Kawasaki Motors Mfg. Corp., USA v. NLRB,
850 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1988).
Taken as a whole, Sides‟s registration with two
government agencies, his frequent searches for job openings
through friends and newspaper listings, his submission of
applications to thirty-three employers, and his procurement of
two temporary positions, demonstrate Sides‟s “„honest good
faith effort‟ . . . consistent with the inclination to work and to
be self-supporting,” which satisfies us as reasonable
diligence. Kawasaki, 850 F.2d at 527 (citation omitted). We
find substantial evidence to support the Board‟s conclusion
that General Counsel satisfied its burden of production with
respect to Sides‟s efforts to mitigate.
C.
In its objections to Tharp‟s backpay award, St. George
primarily faults the Board‟s acceptance of Moskus‟s
testimony, which St. George alleges consisted exclusively of
inadmissible hearsay. Moskus‟s testimony was the only
evidence that General Counsel produced of Tharp‟s job
search in Florida. That testimony was also significant for
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expatiating on Tharp‟s earlier pursuit of employment in New
Jersey.
Section 10(b) of the NLRA, as codified at 29 U.S.C. §
160(b), provides that Board proceedings “shall, so far as
practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of
evidence applicable in the district courts of the United
States.” Based on that provision, some courts have concluded
that even if a discriminatee is unavailable to testify in a Board
proceeding by reason of death, his extra-judicial statements
are inadmissible hearsay. See NLRB v. United Sanitation
Serv., 737 F.2d 936, 940 (11th Cir. 1984); Cent. Freight
Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1981).
However, we have recognized the Board‟s power to
construe the rules of evidence liberally. In NLRB v. Louton,
Inc., we held that “[t]he conduct of a backpay proceeding and
the application of the evidentiary rules lie within the
discretion of the administrative judge,” and, moreover, “the
party claiming injury from the alleged error must show that it
suffered prejudice as a result of the ruling, in order for the
Board‟s order to be reversed.” 822 F.2d 412, 416 (3d Cir.
1987) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also, e.g., Carpenter Sprinkler Corp. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 60,
66 (2d Cir. 1979) (concluding that since “the Board is not
required to observe automatically all the rules of evidence
governing the trial of cases in court,” it was entitled to create
a new evidentiary rule); NLRB v. W. B. Jones Lumber Co.,
245 F.2d 388, 392 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that “[t]he Board
is not required to observe the legal rules of evidence as are
common law courts,” and thus, “the evidence offered was
admissible even though it may have involved hearsay”). The
appropriate inquiry “is whether the relaxation of the Federal
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Rules of Evidence by the administrative law judge was
reasonable under the circumstances and limited in its
application to the practicalities of th[e] situation.” Conley v.
NLRB, 520 F.3d 629, 640 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming decision
to admit witness‟s extra-judicial affidavits, even though they
partially contradicted witness‟s testimony and consisted of
hearsay, in order to ensure important evidence was not
suppressed).
The evidentiary issues posed here mirror those
addressed by the Second Circuit in NLRB v. Mastro Plastics
Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965). In Mastro, the relatives
of two deceased discriminatees had testified as to the
discriminatees‟ diligent searches for work. The Second
Circuit held that such testimony was properly admitted:
Even if the testimony here
received would be inadmissible
hearsay in a civil action, we are
not prepared to require the Board
to exclude it from a back pay
hearing. As the discriminatee
could not be produced, the Board
could accept other evidence which
tended to establish the facts.
Here, the evidence was testimony
as to the deceased‟s discussions of
his search for alternative work.
We
do
not
consider
it
„practicable,‟ as that word is used
in Section 10(b), to exclude this
relevant testimony.
Moreover,
since the burden of proving lack

18

of a diligent search was on [the
employer], we fail to see how the
admission of this testimony was
prejudicial. . . . [T]he Board can
only be expected to make
available for the employer‟s
cross-examination such evidence
as it may reasonably obtain.
Mastro, 354 F.2d at 179.
We conclude that the Board‟s affirmance of the ALJ‟s
decision to allow Moskus to testify, given that it was the best
evidence available, was not improper. Prior to the Board‟s
September 30, 2007, decision, the prevailing rule in Board
proceedings was that the burden of production never shifted
to General Counsel, who thus had no reason to collect or
preserve evidence related to mitigation. However, when the
Board imposed on General Counsel a new duty to produce
evidence, it placed General Counsel in an especially
untenable position, since the ALJ‟s initial decision was issued
about five years earlier, and the backpay sought covered a
period spanning from 1999 to 2000.
By September 2007, most of the evidence that would
have corroborated, or been more facially reliable than,
Moskus‟s testimony was unavailable. Indeed, Tharp had died
in the five-year interim, and thus, General Counsel could not
produce the most obvious evidence of his search, i.e., Tharp‟s
testimony. We agree with the ALJ‟s ruling that it would not
“be appropriate or fair to the innocent, unlawfully discharged
employee to require, in the circumstances of this unique case,
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more specific evidence of Tharp‟s search for work than has
already been provided.” (A8.)
Lastly, St. George argues that General Counsel failed
to carry its burden of showing that Tharp exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking interim employment in either
New Jersey or Florida.
General Counsel produced evidence that Tharp filed
for employment benefits the day after he was discharged, and
had certified on his application that he was “ready, willing
and able” to accept long-term work. On a Board backpay
questionnaire, Tharp listed seven New Jersey employers to
whom he had applied in the span of five days. Both Moskus
and Sarro testified that when Tharp‟s search in New Jersey
proved unsuccessful, he moved to Florida in the hopes of
finding more job opportunities. Two weeks after he arrived
in Florida in September 1999, he began scanning newspaper
listings, submitting applications, and visiting employers. He
obtained a job with Naples Lumber the following month, in
mid-October 1999, which he held through the end of the
backpay period.
We agree that substantial evidence was adduced from
which the Board could conclude that General Counsel met its
burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of Tharp‟s job
search. As discussed above, the act of registering with the
unemployment office is prima facie evidence of reasonable
diligence. E.g., Midwestern Personnel, 508 F.3d at 424;
Church Homes, 349 N.L.R.B. at 834. The NLRB backpay
questionnaire -- the only obtainable documentation of his
search -- indicates that Tharp submitted seven applications
over five days, and Moskus‟s testimony corroborated his
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diligence throughout.
Given the unique evidentiary
difficulties presented in this case, General Counsel‟s inability
to obtain and produce further documentation should not
defeat Tharp‟s entitlement to backpay. See, e.g., Rainbow
Coaches, 280 N.L.R.B. 166, 179 (1986), enforced, 835 F.2d
1436 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Claimants are not disqualified from
receiving backpay solely because of poor recordkeeping or
uncertain memories.”). Moreover, it is significant that Tharp
relocated to a different state to find a job, and successfully
obtained one in about a month‟s time. See Midwestern
Personnel, 508 F.3d at 423-24 (listing fact that discriminatee
accepted job that “required prolonged periods away from
home” as probative of reasonable search). Cumulatively, that
evidence was enough to demonstrate Tharp‟s reasonable
efforts to attain interim employment.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was
substantial evidence in the record from which the Board could
conclude that both Sides and Tharp exercised reasonable
diligence in searching for work following their illegal
discharge from St. George. Accordingly, we will affirm and
enforce the order awarding backpay in the amounts of
$26,447.90 to Sides and $14,649.79 to Tharp‟s estate.
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